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OF TRAIN WRECKS, TIME BOMBS, AND
SKINNED CATS: THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE TO THE FALL OF THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO
Michael J. Horan *
INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the aftermath of what may well be considered the
most important non-civil liberties decision of the Burger Court: Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha.' In this case, the Supreme
Court struck down the "legislative veto" as an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional authority. The "legislative veto" was a procedural device
which Congress had included in a sizable number of statutes delegating
rule-making or other types of administrative authority to executive agencies
or officers. Through this veto provision, Congress simultaneously reserved
the power to block specific exercises of this authority by passage of resolu-
tions which were not submitted for presidential review, such as a concur-
rent resolution of disapproval (two-house veto) or a simple resolution of
disapproval by either house (one-house veto). Chief Justice Burger's opin-
ion for the Court found that insofar as the exercise of the one-house veto
affected the legal rights and duties of persons outside the legislative branch,
it lacked conformity with those provisions of Article I of the Constitution
requiring that such "legislative" actions receive the assent of both houses of
Congress, and be presented to the President for approval or disapproval.2
Subsequent rulings by the Court3 left little doubt that the lack of presiden-
tial review also rendered the two-house veto constitutionally infirm.
The first reports of the Court's nullification of the legislative veto varied
considerably in terms of the decision's projected impact. National news me-
dia discussed the likely effect of the Chadha decision upon congressional-
executive relationships,4 though it is doubtful that public interest in what
superficially resembled a mere procedural matter could ever compare to the
• Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. B.S., Georgetown University, 1960; Ph.D.,
Georgetown University, 1966. The author would like to thank William A. "Doc" Syers of the
Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma, and cur-
rently Assistant to the Director of the Republican Policy Committee of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, for his helpful comments concerning the revision of this article.
1. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. Id. at 952.
3. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983),
affg Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affg Consumers Union of the
United States v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
4. Anderson, An Epic Court Decision, TIME, July 4, 1983, at 12; Press, The Court Vetoes the Veto,
NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1983, at 16; Supreme Court Decison that Stunned Congress, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 4, 1983 at 14-15; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1983, at 1, col. 4; Wash. Post, June 24,
1983, at 1, col. 4.
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reception given such dramatic Burger Court decisions as those dealing with
abortion5 and affirmative action.6 Scholarly circles in government and the
legal world recognize the great importance of the Court's ruling, commen-
tary on which became obligatory in law reviews as well as monographs and
textbooks in the fields of government and public administration.7 The
shock waves of the Chadha decision impinged most strongly, however,
upon the branch of government which was the apparent loser in the case,
the Congress. It is easy to sympathize with the dismay which echoed from
the House and Senate over the fall of the legislative veto. Variations of this
device had been inserted into legislation for over fifty years,8 and indeed had
been utilized on an ever-increasing scale since the early 1970's.9 Resort to
the legislative veto was one of the principle means by which a resurgent
Congress had sought to counter the growth of executive and administrative
dominance in the areas of domestic policy and, particularly, foreign affairs.
While figures vary slightly from one source to another, it is no exaggeration
to say that the Chadha decision cast grave doubt upon 300 separate provi-
sions of 200 past and present statutes,'o including sixty laws then in effect. 1
Clearly, Congress needed to respond to fill the gap in its power appar-
ently created by Chadha. The existing vast delegations of authority to the
President, executive agencies, and independent regulatory commissions,
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. E.g., Brayer, The Legislative Veto after Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984); DeConcini & Faucher,
The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by any other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 29 (1984); De
Seife, Legislative Delegation of Powers: A Hobson's Choice?, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 279 (1984); McMa-
non, Chadha and the Non-delegation Doctrine. Defining a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE L.J.
1493 (1985); Strauss, Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1984); ANNUAL EDITIONS: AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT 59-64 (B. Stinebrickner ed. 1985).
8. Economy Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-212, §§ 401-408, 47 Stat. 382, 413-15 (Act repealed) (Presi-
dent enabled to reorganize federal administrative departments and agencies by executive order
unless Congress blocked the actions by simple resolution of either house within 60 days); Navy
Construction Authorization Act of 1944, Pub L. No. 78-289, 58 Stat. 189, 190 (Act repealed)
(required the Secretary of the Navy to "come into agreement with" the House and Senate Naval
Affairs Committees before entering into real estate transactions acquiring, disposing of, or leasing
land or facilities for naval installations); Taft Anti-Inflation Law, Pub. L. No. 80-395, § 7, 61 Stat.
945, 947 (1947) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1911-1919 (1982)) (Commodity Credit Corporation au-
thorized to implement projects to stimulate food production in non-European countries, such pro-
grams to be submitted to Congress which could disapprove them by concurrent resolution within
60 days); National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 302(c), 72 Stat. 426,
433 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2453(c) (1982)) (President's transfer to National Air and Space Ad-
ministration of functions of other departments and agencies may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 872, 899 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982)) (tariff on duty recommended by Tariff Commission may be imposed by
concurrent resolution of approval); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555,
556-57 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982)) (absent declaration of war,
President may be directed by concurrent resolution to remove United States' armed forces engaged
in foreign hostilities); Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-464,
§ 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1463a(2) (1982)) (rules proposed by the Secretary
of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). See generally J. HARRIS, CONGRES-
SIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 217-38 (1964).
9. "Well over half the acts containing vetoes and over two thirds of the individual provisions have
been passed since 1969." West & Cooper, The Congressional Veto and Administrative Rule-making,
98 POL. SCI. Q. 285, 286 (1983).
10. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967 (White, J., dissenting). See generally West & Cooper, supra note 9.
11. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at 1, cols. 4-5; Rules Sets Policy on Legislative Veto, 41 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1564 (1983); Panel Skirts Legislative Veto Ban, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1576
(1983).
Journal of Legislation
now likely freed from congressional inhibition through the exercise of a leg-
islative veto, per se seemed to call for attention from the lawmakers. As-
suming the need for some kind of response, what alternatives were
practically-and legally-available to Congress in place of the lost veto au-
thority? Should this response be swift or measured? Comprehensive, or on
a case-by-case basis? Was the legislative veto itself completely dead, or
might it still be legally viable in particular contexts? How would the secon-
dary issues left pending by the Chadha decision be settled, and should Con-
gress-or the courts-be responsible for this task? Finally, who really
would gain from Chadha-the Executive, the Congress, or some other
group inside or outside government?
Over two years have elapsed since Chadha and its progeny were de-
cided, and at least some of the dust stirred up by the matter has begun to
settle. Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary have each in differ-
ent ways begun to sort out the details of the new definition of the separation
of powers formula spelled out by the court in Chadha. This article exam-
ines the principle developments of the post-Chadha period in this regard. It
inquires whether any patterns have begun to emerge and suggests the possi-
ble directions these patterns may follow in the near future. This article
focuses primarily upon the legislative branch although, as will become evi-
dent, the nature of the congressional response to Chadha cannot be under-
stood without reference to attitudes and positions taken by members of the
other branches of the federal government.
THE SCOPE OF THE CHADHA RULING
The breadth of the majority opinion in INS v. Chadha appears to leave
little doubt that the legislative veto, whatever its form, is in deep constitu-
tional trouble. The veto struck down in Chadha was contained in a provi-
sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195212 qualifying the
Attorney General's discretionary authority to suspend deportation proceed-
ings against aliens illegally staying in the United States.'3 The law required
the Attorney General to report each such suspension to Congress,"4 which
could overturn this officer's decision in any particular case by a simple reso-
lution of either the Senate or the House of Representatives.15 This was a
"one-house" veto provision, since disapproval of the suspension by either
house was legally conclusive, the matter requiring neither concurrence by
the other chamber nor presidential review.
Eschewing policy considerations as well as narrower constitutional
grounds, the Chadha majority found that when the exercise of this one-
house veto had a legislative effect, 16 it must comply with the ordinary law-
12. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, Pub, L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1982)).
13. Id. at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). The Attorney General's authority applied only in specified
circumstances.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The one-house veto had a legislative effect upon Chadha in that by virtue of the resolution of
disapproval passed by the House of Representatives, he was immediately deportable.
[Vol. 13:22
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making procedures spelled out in Article I of the Constitution,17 including
passage by both houses18 and presentment to the President for approval or
dispapproval.' 9 Failure to comply with either of these steps in the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure"20 for making laws
devised by the framers of the Constitution meant that the exercise of the
one-house veto in Chadha was without constitutional foundation.2 The
reasoning used by the majority in Chadha plainly extends to the two-house
legislative veto found in those statutory provisions where Congress has
given itself authority to review and stop administrative moves through con-
current resolution of both houses, again without presidential review.
Although bicameral, this procedure still circumvented the presentment re-
quirements of Article I.
A third form of congressional veto device, known as the "committee
veto," was on even shakier grounds as a result of Chadha. Used increas-
ingly after 1945 to oversee executive agency actions in the realms of con-
tracts, public works, and the disposal of surplus federal property,22 this type
of statutory provision enabled Congress to confer veto powers upon either
or both of the relevant committees of the House and Senate, and occasion-
ally solely upon the chairmen of those committees. Like the one-house
veto, the committee veto fails to meet the bicameral and presentment re-
quirements of Article I. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion also viti-
ated another form of the legislative veto by noting that statutory provisions
enabling Congress to repeal or terminate statutes or administrative actions
taken pursuant to delegated authority by simple or concurrent resolution
were similarly invalid.23 Finally, any lingering hope that the Court might
limit Chadha to the legislative veto of decisions of purely executive agencies
(such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service) was erased by the
Court's summary affirmation of a United States Court of Appeals judgment
striking down a section of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements
Act of 1980 which provided for a two-house veto over any rule issued by
the FTC.24
The sheer number of legislative vetoes for which Chadha sounded the
death knell reflects the far-reaching effects of the Court's decision.25 Con-
gress enacted most of these vetoes after 1969 on a progressively wider basis
in order to hold the President and the bureaucracy more accountable to
what legislators felt was the law, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.2 6
Thus, the legislative veto became a common mechanism by which Congress
sought to reserve for itself a check upon such executive actions as the termi-
17. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-51, 954-55.
18. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 1, 7.
19. Id. § 7, cl. 3.
20. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
21. Id. at 944-59.
22. J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 205, 217-32 (1964).
23. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 253-54, 255, n.18.
24. United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), affig 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
25. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
26. See generally West & Cooper, supra note 9; Zeidenstein, The Reassertion of Congressional Power:
New Curbs on the President, 93 POL. Sci. Q. 393 (1978).
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nation of national emergencies 27 and military operations, 28 the impound-
ment of appropriated funds,29 the export of nuclear materials,30 major arms
sales abroad,31 foreign trade,32 and space exploration.33 Congress also found
the legislative veto a useful tool for overseeing the domestic bureaucracy.
During the 1970's Congress gave itself the right to disapprove, by vote of
one or both houses, regulations issued by a variety of administrative bodies,
including certain independent regulatory commissions.34 Until Chadha
brought these developments to a halt, it seemed possible that Congress
might extend the legislative veto across-the-board to nearly all agency regu-
lations. 35 By any measure, Chadha invalidated what Congress itself viewed
as an important technique for redressing the balance of political power
which had tilted away from it in the previous half-century.
As straightforward as it seemed, the Court's decision was not entirely
without its loose ends. A few observers raised the possibility that the Court
might reconsider the legislative veto if the policy context were special (e.g.,
concerning foreign affairs or the disposal of federal property)36 or if the veto
were implemented by means of the appropriations power (e.g., through leg-
islation barring the expenditure of money to enforce administrative actions
disapproved by a congressional committee).3 7  Nothing in the majority
opinion suggested this, however, and prospects for salvaging some of the
legislative vetoes currently on the books seemed remote. Aside from this,
the main legal questions unanswered in Chadha relate to the issues of retro-
activity 38 and severability.39 The first of these turns on the question of how
the Court's ruling would be applied in post-Chadha lawsuits challenging
27. National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622 (1976)).
28. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-57 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1973)).
29. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88
Stat. 297, 334-35 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 684 (1974)).
30. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, §§ 104(0, 303(a)-(b), 306-308, 401, 92
Stat. 120, 123, 130-31, 134-35, 137-39, 144 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3223(0; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2153c-d,
2155(b), 2157(b), 2158-2159, 2160(0 (Supp. 1985)).
31. International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, §§ 211(a),
301(a), 302(a)-(b), 90 Stat. 729, 743, 748, 751-752 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(c)(3),
2314(g)(4)(c), 2755(d), 2776(b) (1979)).
32. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 §§ 203(c), 33 1(a), 402(d), 405(c), 407, 88 Stat. 1978, 2015,
2049, 2051-52, 2056-59, 2061, 2063 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303(e), 2253(c), 2432(d), 2435, 2437
(1980)).
33. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-361, §§ 103-104, 98
Stat. 422, 424-25 (1984).
34. See, e.g., The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a),
94 Stat. 374, 393 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-620,
§ 402(13), 98 Stat. 3358 (1984) (FTC rules were disapproved by concurrent resolution).
35. Bills to this effect passed the Senate in 1982 but died in the House Rules Committee. See S. 1080,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
36. See, e.g., Hearings on the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 229 (1983) (statement of Eugene Gressman,
Professor, University of North Carolina) [hereinafter cited as Hearings I]. For an application of
this theory to Congress' proprietary powers, see National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F.
Supp. 1145, 1157 (D.D.C. 1983).
37. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 115 (statement of Eugene Gressman). Bills currently before Congress
which would rely upon the appropriations power to deny funding to congressionally disfavored
administrative actions include S. 1145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and H.R. Con. Res. 2, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
38. See, e.g., Baker, Chadha and the Public Lands: Is FLPMA Affected, 5 PuB. LAND L. REV. 55
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governmental actions taken prior to the Supreme Court's decision. Would
the nullification of the legislative veto extend only to future attempts by
Congress to wield the veto, or could plaintiffs now seek judicial invalidation
of successful past veto resolutions, thus "reviving" administrative actions
thought dead for years? The second unresolved question of Chadha in-
volves the problem of severability; whether a legislative veto clause qualify-
ing some congressional grant of authority can be held unconstitutional
without at the same time nullifying the grant of authority. Did the mere
presence of the unconstitutional legislative veto in the law delegating to an
agency the power to take the particular administrative action "taint" the
constitutionality of the law on the grounds that the delegated authority and
Congress' reservation of veto power over it were inseparable?
The answer to the severability question depends in large part upon a
judicial case-by-case (or veto-by-veto) reading of Congress' intent concern-
ing the severability of the offending clause from the remainder of the law.
In Chadha, the majority held that Congress wanted the courts to excise any
invalid parts of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act and leave the
rest standing, including the Attorney General's authority to suspend the
deportation of aliens in specified circumstances.' The Court's decision to
sever the unconstitutional legislative veto from the remainder of the law
was supported by an express wish of Congress to this effect in the severabil-
ity clause of the 1952 law.41 However, as the presence or absence of a sever-
ability clause is rarely dispositive of the question, the Court in Chadha had
to engage in the highly speculative process of estimating whether Congress
would have granted the Attorney General suspension of deportation power
without reserving a veto for itself. An examination of the legislative history
of the 1952 law convinced the seven majority Justices that Congress would
have done just that.42 The same legislative history, however, led Justices
Rehnquist and White to the opposite conclusion.43 The Court addressed
severability again two weeks after Chadha was handed down, when it sum-
marily affirmed" a United States Court of Appeals decision striking down a
provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 which gave either house of
Congress power to veto certain gas pricing rules issued by the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC).45 The Court of Appeals had found
(1984). This article focuses on a particular statute that might be affected by the Chadha decision
because it contains a legislative veto provision.
39. See, e.g., Note, Severing the Legislative Veto Provision: The Aftermath of Chadha, 21 CAL. W.L.
REV. 174 (1984).
40. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The words of this section under the "Separability of Provisions" subhead-
ing clearly state the intent of Congress: "If any particular provision of this Act, or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application
of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
42. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934.
43. Id. at 967-1016 (White, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), aff'g
Consumer Energy Counsel of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d 425
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The court discussed the severability issue in a footnote which suggested that the
legislative history of the Act and the omission of a severability clause within the Act might indicate
that the legislative veto clause was not severable.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c)(1) (1982).
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the veto severable from the provision of the act granting FERC the relevant
rulemaking authority, this time without benefit of a severability clause, and
where the act's legislative history "arguably" suggested nonseverability. 6
In other statutes containing legislative vetoes, the question of severabil-
ity has to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Would Congress have per-
mitted the President to make major weapons sales to other countries-in
the form that authority now takes-without retaining power to veto any
particular sale by concurrent resolution?47 Would Congress have author-
ized the President to temporarily defer expenditures of appropriated funds
without having reserved the power to block particular deferrals by a resolu-
tion of disapproval passed in either house?48 Answering critical questions
of this type requires an examination of each legislative veto in the light of its
statutory context, purpose, and history. The courts-as well as Congress-
would soon have to confront these often imponderable matters.
THE INITIAL REACTION TO CHADHA
The legislative veto never reached deep into the public consciousness.
While specific attempts by Congress to use the device (as in the 1981 effort
to stop the sale of Airborne Warning and Control [AWAC] planes to Saudi
Arabia4 9) could momentarily catch public attention, the legitimacy of the
veto itself had been fought out among public officials, academics, and law-
yers. The reception accorded the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha re-
flects this pattern. Major newspapers and broadcast media proclaimed the
significance of the case for presidential-congressional relations,5 ° particu-
larly in light of major recent attempts by Congress to rein in presidential
powers in the fields of warmaking, arms sales, and impoundment.51 Also
covered were the immediate reactions to the decision by officials in the gov-
46. Hearings on the Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Chadha and Its Implications for Congressional
Oversight and Agency Rulemaking Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1983) (statement of
Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney-Geneneral) [hereinafter cited as Hearings II].
47. See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2304(c)(3), 2314(g)(4)(c), 2755(d), 2776(b) (1979).
48. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (1974)).
49. See HOUSE COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., CONGRESS AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY-1981 (Comm. Print 1982).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at 8, col. 5; Wash. Post, June 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Wall St.
J., June 26, 1983, at D8, col. 1; Wall St. J., July 27, 1983, at 28, col. 1.
51. In all of these fields, the President is given a limited delegation of authority due to the inclusion of
veto provisions which allow Congress to reverse his decisions. The respective acts with regard to
each field are as follows: (A) The War Powers Resolution of 1973. This act controls the extent to
which the President may engage in military operations without a congressional declaration of war.
In such instances Congress may, by concurrent resolution, direct the President to remove U.S.
troops from a foreign conflict. (B) The Military Appropriations Act of 1975. This act controls the
extent to which the President can export defense goods, technology or techniques. Congress may
curtail the President's activity in this area by concurrent resolution. For a recent example of
Congress' attempt to utilize the veto provision of this bill, see supra note 49. (C) The Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This act controls the extent to which the
President may refuse to spend money Congress has appropriated. The President's proposed defer-
ral of budget authority may be disapproved by a resolution of either chamber. See N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1983, at 5, col. 1 and Wash. Post, June 24, 1983, at 15, col. 1 for a short summary of these
and other bills containing legislative veto provisions.
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ernment, including the House and Senate. 52 It was not long, however,
before the issue faded from public attention.
The Chadha decision, however, remained in the minds of the policy
elites most concerned with the legislative veto, particularly within the legis-
lative branch. The sharpest reaction to the Court's decision came from
those members of Congress who championed the legislative veto as a neces-
sary means of checking the power of the Executive and the bureaucracy.
Representative Elliot H. Levitas (D-Ga.), the unacknowledged leader of
this group, branded Chadha a "train wreck" in the governmental process"3
and called for immediate action by Congress to replace the veto with an
equally effective way of "skinning the same cat."' 54 Stanley M. Brand, Gen-
eral Counsel to the House of Representatives (and one of the counsel on the
losing side in Chadha), noted that it "took the Court 18 months to screw up
what it took Congress 50 years to set up."'5 5 Brand saw the only way of
coping with this loss of the means to check the bureaucracy was for Con-
gress to repeal and rewrite more narrowly the legislation delegating
rulemaking power in the first place.56 Many congressmen viewed Chadha
as taking away one of the major tools by which Congress had been able to
influence foreign policy in the previous ten years, while a senior congres-
sional aide warned that the President's victory in the case would eventually
be overshadowed by the passage in Congress of much more restrictive laws
controlling executive authority. 7 Indicative of this type of initial response
was the approval by the House of Representatives of a Levitas-sponsored
amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Commission reauthorization
bill5 8 which prevented the expenditure of funds to enforce any major CPSC
regulation until Congress had enacted a joint resolution (which would go to
the President for review) approving the regulation. Failure by either house
to pass such a resolution would effectively kill the proposed regulation.59
Perhaps most noteworthy about this initial reaction of Congress, how-
ever, was the refusal of the leadership of either house to be stampeded into
precipitous action. Many members who had opposed the legislative veto on
52. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1983, at 8, col. 5; Wash.
Post, June 24, 1983, at 1, col. 3; Wash. Post, June 25, 1983, at 3, col. 3.
53. Witt, Legislative Veto Shrunk Down; Congress Moves to Review Dozens of Existing Statutes, 41
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1263, 1264 (1983) (quoting Representative Elliot H. Levitas (D-Ga.)):
"There is a train wreck if this decision is broadly read. Congress will have to work quickly to
circumscribe rulemaking."
54. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 319. See also Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Executive
and Agency After Chadha: The Son of Legislative 'Veto' Lives On, 72 GEO. L.J. 801 (1984).
55. Regulatory Reform Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Administration
Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 698
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings III]. Similar to this was the reaction of House Foreign Affairs
Chairman Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.): the Court "by the stroke of a pen has negated everything
Congress has done in the past 10 years." Felton, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1265 (1983).
56. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 7-9, 26-28; Hearings II, supra note 46, at 209, 215.
57. See Felton, supra note 55, at 1265: "A senior aide to the Foreign Relations Committee predicted
the decision would give the [P]resident more flexibility 'in the short term,' but that eventually
Congress could make life 'much more complicated' for the [P]resident by passing even more re-
strictive laws."
58. H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
59. See 129 CONG. REC. H4781-84 (daily ed. June 29, 1983); Sarasohn, House Votes New Oversight
Methods for Safety Agency; Severely Cuts Authorization, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1365 (1983).
The bill died in the Senate.
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constitutional or policy grounds welcomed the Court's decision and were
likely to be less than enthusiastic about rushing to find a substitute for it.6°
More typical of the leadership's initial reaction, however, was a recognition
that something needed to be done about the likely invalidity of legislative
veto clauses in a large number of important statutes across the policy spec-
trum, but that a "quick fix" in this regard, such as a constitutional amend-
ment, was neither necessary nor desirable. They felt that Congress should
approach the problem in an orderly, methodical fashion.6' One result of
this determination was the announcement by four congressional committees
and subcommittees that they would soon hold hearings on the effects of the
Chadha decision, as well as on the appropriate congressional response.62 In
the same vein, the House Rules Committee announced it would not act on
any bill containing a legislative veto referred to it after June 23, 1983, the
day Chadha was announced. 63 The Committee would consider bills con-
taining legislative vetoes sent to it for a rule before this date only if the
originating committee removed the veto, or changed it to conform to
Chadha.6
Much of the explanation for this go-slow approach by the congressional
leadership can be attributed to the real uncertainty as to the precise impact
of Chadha upon Congress' role and influence, especially in the area of con-
gressional oversight. Realization of the numerous other sources of power
that the legislative branch could draw upon in its relations with the Execu-
tive and administrative agencies relieved some of the sting of the Court's
decision. The essentially moderate tone of the leadership's response would
not have been possible, however, had the Reagan administration not
adopted a conciliatory posture with respect to the powers accruing to it as a
result of Chadha. Although Attorney General William French Smith and
White House spokesmen praised the Court for ruling what the Executive
had "known" to be true all along, there was little official gloating over the
dead legislative veto, at least in public. Top officials disavowed any attempt
on the part of executive branch agencies to take advantage of the now non-
vetoable grants of authority they had been given by Congress65 and prom-
ised to "observe scrupulously" the still-viable provisions of those laws obli-
gating the agencies to give Congress advance notification of any intended
action (such as a major arms sale, the export of nuclear materials, or the
deferral of appropriated expenditures), and to defer such action until any
required "waiting period" had expired. This would allow Congress the op-
portunity to stop any particular action from going into effect, as long as
Congress subsequently proceeded in accordance with Article I of the Con-
stitution. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam's statement before a
60. See, e.g., Witt, supra note 53, at 1264.
61. See Sarasohn, supra note 59, at 1327-28.
62. Id.
63. Rules Sets Policy on Legislative Veto, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1564 (1983); Panel Skirts Legis-
lative Veto Ban, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1576 (1983).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Hearings II, supra note 46. But see the position taken by Interior Dep't Secretary James
Watt, infra note 175.
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subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee downplaying the impact
of Chadha was reassuring:
[L]ittle of practical significance need in fact change as a result of the
Supreme Court decision. The Department of State will continue to work
closely with the members and committees of Congress and to take their
concerns into account in reaching decisions on issues of policy. If anything,
I believe Chadha will make the. . . Executive Branch more, not less, con-
scious that they are accountable for their actions.66
This evidently sincere desire on the part of the Administration to avoid
anything resembling a grab for power clearly played an important role in
the ability of the congressional leadership to defuse any sentiment in Con-
gress to fashion an immediate and comprehensive substitute for the legisla-
tive veto.
THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
The next phase of the aftermath of Chadha, at least in the political
realm, unfolded in the hearing rooms of the House and Senate. Various
committees and subcommittees of each chamber conducted hearings on the
Chadha case and its impact both generally and upon particular laws within
the committees' areas of concern. Subcommittees of the House67 and Sen-
ate68 Judiciary Committees, as well as the Foreign Affairs69 and Rules' °
Committees of the House conducted the widest-ranging of these hearings.
During the course of the hearings, held primarily in the summer and fall of
1983, various witnesses submitted statements (both oral and written) con-
cerning the effects of Chadha and how Congress might respond. Most of
these persons held federal governmental positions of various kinds, includ-
ing members of Congress and the judiciary, higher-echelon executive de-
partment officers, independent regulatory commissioners, congressional
counsel, and specialists from within the Congressional Research Service.
The "outside" witnesses consisted almost exclusively of academic experts
(law and political science professors) and representatives of bar associations
and other interested lobbying groups.
Several themes characterized the views expressed during these hearings.
Regardless of the witnesses' positions on the legal or political merits of the
legislative veto, they generally agreed that the majority rationale in Chadha
had either struck dead the legislative veto or pronounced it a case of termi-
nal unconstitutionality. The Chief Counsel to the House asserted that the
Court's decision wiped out all legislative veto provisions wherever they ex-
66. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 136.
67. See Hearings II, supra note 46; Hearings III, supra note 55.
68. Hearings on S, 1080, a Bill to Amend the Admin. Procedure Act to Require Fed. Agencies to Analyze
the Effects of Rules to Improve Their Effectiveness and for other Purposes Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
Hearings on the Effects of the Supreme Court's Decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha on [the] Legislative Veto Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings IV].
69. Hearings I, supra note 36.
70. Hearings on the Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in the Case of Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha Which Found the Legislative Veto Unconstitutional Before the House Comm.
on Rules, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearings V].
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isted in the statutes,7 and analyses of particular statutes submitted by legal
specialists from the Congressional Research Service concurred.7 2 A few
witnesses professed to see possible signs of life in those vetoes relevant to
matters of foreign relations,73 but they could cite nothing in Chadha or the
Court's summary rulings on July 6, 198371 which would support this
possibility.75
Much more problematic were the questions the Court itself had left for
future resolution, i.e. retroactivity and the "ticking time bomb" of severabil-
ity. From Congress' point of view, House Counsel Brand expressed the
most pessimistic forecast, predicting that the Executive would pick up all
the pieces after Chadha. Assuming that the decision would be applied ret-
roactively, Brand remarked:
[I]t is doubtful how far the [c]ourts will actually need to go to find the
evidence of severability identified in Chadha. In very few instances does the
legislative history reveal the kind of pervasive and abiding concern with
delegating any power at all to the executive without making it entirely de-
pendent on a legislative reservation. Mere reluctance to delegate final au-
thority is not enough.
While we in Congress may feel in our hearts that much of this authority
would not have been delegated without a reservation, I believe the [c]ourts
will find severability in many cases absent an overwhelming record that
establishes that fact.
76
While Brand's assertion found some corroboration in the analyses of
other legal experts,77 most witnesses preferred to approach the severability
issue with caution. All could agree that the problem would ultimately have
to be faced, either by the courts or by Congress, but most expected that the
courts would confront severability on a statute-by-statute basis, with each
veto provision considered in the light of its own context and background.78
71. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 4. "The scope of the ruling is, in my view, as broad and as sweeping
as the dissenting Justice noted in his separate opinion, conjecturing that the decision 'also sounds
the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a legisla-
tive veto.' " Id. (statement of Stanley M. Brand, Chief Counsel to the House).
72. See, e.g., Hearings I, supra note 36, at 231, 243, 296, 302-15, 333-34, 357, 365-66. "Thus it may be
presumed that all congressional veto provisions are now constitutionally suspect notwithstanding
the manner in which they are exercised or the subject manner they cover." Id. at 243.
73. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 115, 157, 229-30 (statement of Eugene Gressman).
74. See supra note 3.
75. One authority has testified that Chadha may not apply in matters of foreign relations.
I also suggested at the July 21 hearing that, while it is safer and perhaps more prudent to
adopt the joint resolution of approval device in light of Chadha, there is a possible exception
to Chadha, particularly in the foreign affairs area of legislation. It seems to me that when
Congress deals with (a) the authorization and appropriation of money for use in (b) the
conduct of foreign affairs, Congress is at the height of its constitutionally exclusive powers.
We are then in the area of "political question" functions textually committed by the Consti-
tution to the Congress. In addition, when Congress conditions the Executive's use of public
funds (or disposal of government property) upon possible congressional disapproval by con-
current resolution, it is arguable that Congress, if it disapproves, is not thereby affecting the
"legal rights, duties and relations" of the Executive in the Chadha sense.
Id. at 229 (statement of Eugene Gressman).
76. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 5.
77. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 221 (statement of Harold Bruff, Univ. of Texas School of Law);
Hearings IV, supra note 68, at 21, 54 (statement of Michael Davidson, Legal Counsel to the
Senate).
78. See, e.g., Hearings I, supra note 36, at 244-45, 263-70, 327-56. See also Hearings V, supra note 70,
at 346, 348 (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R.-N.J.)).
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The probability of a judicial finding of severability was arguably high in
many instances (e.g., the concurrent veto provisions of the War Powers
Resolution and the National Emergencies Act),79 too close to call in others
(e.g., the one-house veto in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Sav-
ings Act8"), and in some instances, not likely to be found. Most frequently
cited in this third category were the legislative vetoes in statutes dealing
with executive branch reorganization, presidential deferral of appropriated
expenditures, and District of Columbia self-government.81
Two divergent views emerged from the hearings regarding Chadha's im-
pact, especially upon the regulatory process, and what response, if any, was
needed. Critics of the decision 82 reiterated their previous warnings that the
effect of the ruling was to add to the already swollen powers of an unac-
countable bureaucracy, and that Congress had no choice but to search for
other equally effective ways of "skinning the cat."83 A crisis loomed, and
Congress had to move decisively if it was to preserve its basic role as poli-
cymaker in the governmental system. Representative Levitas prophesied
the coming struggle:
I am satisfied that we are going to see a major restructuring of the relation-
ship between the Executive Branch and the agencies and the Congress as a
result of the legislative veto decision. This restructuring is going to take
place over a long period of time, I'm afraid. It will be fraught with confron-
tation, there will be some bitterness, and there will be a great deal of diffi-
culty in where we go from here.84
It was repeatedly predicted that broadly phrased authorizing statutes would
become a thing of the past, and the powers that Congress delegated to the
bureaucracy would in the future be much narrower and specific in the dis-
cretion they permitted administrators.8
As for the immediate problem of the power-vacuum created by Chadha,
solutions varied. Amending the Constitution to authorize certain forms of
the defunct legislative veto was suggested, 6 and there was also the usual
talk about depriving the federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear certain
cases; specifically, any further challenges to the constitutionality of the leg-
islative veto. 87 House Counsel Brand, dismissing the possible alternatives
79. Hearings I, supra note 36 at 317-18.
80. Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act § 947, Pub. L. No. 92-513, 86 Stat. 947 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1901 (1972)). Cf. the statements referred to supra in note 72.
81. See, e.g., Hearings II supra note 46, at 247-48 (statement of Rep. John J. Moakley (D-Mass.));
Hearings I, supra note 36, at 244-45.
82. See Witt, supra note 53, at 1284 (comments of Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa); Sen. Carl M.
Levin (D-Mich.); Rep. Elliott H. Levitas (D-Ga.)).
83. See id. (comments of Rep. Levitas).
84. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 319.
85. See Witt, supra note 53, at 1264-65; Hearings II, supra note 46, at 104, 247, 281, 319; Hearings IV,
supra note 68, at 10.
86. H.R.J. Res. 313, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S.J. Res. 135, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Both
were referred to the respective judiciary committees of each chamber. No action was taken on the
House resolution. A Senate subcommittee began hearings on the Senate resolution, but the matter
eventually died in committee. H.R.J. Res. 32, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), the latest effort to write
one-house veto authority into the Constitution, has also been referred to the Judiciary Committee,
where action has yet to be taken.
87. See Granat, Legislative Veto Replacements Considered, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1501 (1983).
Rep. Charles Pashayan, Jr. (R-Calif.) offered the suggestion. Pashayan also proposed giving mem-
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to the legislative veto as all "in one way or another, unsatisfactory," re-
peated his earlier call for wholesale repeal of those statutes delegating ad-
ministrative authority subject to check by legislative veto, and called for
reformulation of those laws from the beginning."' Representative Levitas
urged that Congress, by law, insert into the authorizing bills for regulatory
agencies and executive departments a general requirement, promptly
dubbed "son of legislative veto," whereby every "major" rule or action con-
templated by an agency would be regarded as no more than a proposal until
Congress had affirmatively adopted it by joint resolution, followed by refer-
ral to the President.8 9 A more moderate and certainly less cumbersome
way of skinning the cat was exemplified in the Levin-Boren bill.90 Under
this bill, Congress would legislate a general requirement that agencies give
Congress thirty days' advance notification of all "significant" rules, during
which time the relevant committee of either house could extend this "wait-
ing period" an additional sixty days by voting to report a joint resolution of
disapproval of the intended rule.9 ' If, within this waiting period, both
houses approved a joint resolution of disapproval of the rule-and the Presi-
dent concurred-the rule would be permanently barred from taking ef-
fect. 92 The Levin-Boren bill also contained special procedures to expedite
floor consideration of such disapproval resolutions, by preventing them
from being bottled up in committee or filibustered to death. 93
A second, rather different estimate of the impact of Chadha and the
appropriate congressional response also emerged during the course of these
bers of Congress weight in federal appeals court if they challenged the validity of rules that were
disapproved by concurrent resolution. Id.
88. See Hearings I, supra note 36, at 8-9, 26-27, 33. Brand testified:
My own view is, as an advocate for the House of Representatives, that we "wipe the slate
clean" and repeal all delegations which were enacted under the now erroneous assumptions
made before Chadha. Justice White has framed the dilemma Congress must now confront
in stark terms: "Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating
the necessary authority, leaving itself with the hopeless task of writing laws with the requi-
site specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or
in the alternative, abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and independent
agencies."
For me the choice is clear. I can conceive of no supportable argument that we should
abdicate legislative responsibility. It was, after all, an emboldened executive which attacked
these statutes as unconstitutional on every front to provide a "vital check against tyranny."
Id. at 8-9.
89. Hearings III, supra note 55, at 321-22, 333-34; H.R. 3939, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also
H.R. 82, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 1339, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
90. S. 1650, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4119, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). S. 1145, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) is to the same effect. See also Hearings II, supra note 46, at 244-45; Hearings IV,
supra note 68, at 7-12. The bill was named for its chief Senate sponsors, Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and
David Boren (D-Okla.).
91. Id.
92. S. 1145 provides that a recommended "final major rule" (one that is likely to cost $100 million or
more per year, or one that is likely to cause either substantial increases in costs or significant
adverse effects on the economy) would become effective unless a joint resolution disapproving the
rule is enacted within 90 days of receipt of the rule by the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of
the House of Representatives. A "final nonmajor rule" would become effective in 45 days unless a
joint resolution is enacted. See S. 1145, supra note 90, at 8, 9, 11.
93. S. 1145 allows senators and representatives to move to discharge a committee from further consid-
eration of a joint resolution and bring the matter to full chamber consideration. When a joint
resolution is placed on the House or Senate calendar, S. 1145 allows a motion for immediate con-
sideration of the joint resolution with a maximum two-hour debate. See S. 1145, supra note 90, at
17, 18.
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hearings. Largely passed over during the initial period of reaction to the
Supreme Court's decision, this view regarded the Chadha ruling with far
more equanimity, perhaps even with a sense of relief. Of the Administra-
tion officials testifying at the hearings, political astuteness and a sincere de-
sire to avoid confrontation undoubtedly contributed to their efforts to play
down the overall effects of the Chadha ruling. These witnesses were joined
by academics,94 lawyers, 95 and interest group spokesmen 96 who had long
argued 97 that the legislative veto badly distorted the policy-making process
in both Congress and the administrative agencies. Arguing that Chadha
"clears the air" for dealing with the "real problems of regulatory reform," a
witness from the American Bar Association told one subcommittee that he
thought the reactions to Chadha had been "substantially overstated" by the
press and the proponents of the legislative veto. 98 Supporting his view were
the off-the-bench remarks of a respected federal court of appeals judge, sub-
mitted into evidence, 99 who concluded that in terms of its effect upon the
regulatory process, Chadha would have no substantial impact because the
legislative veto itself had had no such impact.t °° Many witnesses stressed
that Congress retained an impressive array of weapons for dealing with an
unresponsive bureaucracy as well as the Executive, including the traditional
techniques of oversight, investigations, appropriations, durational limits on
delegations of power, and, ultimately, legislation. 10 These reminders, com-
bined with the oft-repeated assurances of consultation and cooperation by
the Administration, even led House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman
Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.) to recede from his earlier position:
I . . . agree that the Chadha decision has not really blown everything to
94. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 214-33 (statement of Harold H. Bruff, University of Texas School of
Law); id., at 234-45 (statement of Neil H. Cogan; Professor of Constitutional Law, Southern Meth-
odist University).
95. Id. at 197-214 (statement of Richard B. Smith, Chairman, Coordinating Group on Regulatory
Reform, American Bar Association).
96. Id. at 142 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen's Litigation Group).
97. See, e.g., Gilmour, The Congressional Veto: Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control, 2 J.
POL'Y ANAL. & MGMT. 13 (1982); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative
Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977). Both articles analyze
the controversy over the legislative veto dating back to the early 1970's. Gilmour discusses the
impact upon Congress of 555 provisions of 335 federal statutes requiring congressional review.
Bruff and Gellhorn review five federal programs subject to the legislative veto: the Office of Educa-
tion's establishment of family contribution schedules for its program of basic grants for post-secon-
dary legislation (1971); the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's rules issued under the
General Education Provision Act (1974); the Federal Energy Administration's exemptions from
price and allocation controls on petroleum products (1973); the General Services Administration's
regulation on access to the Nixon papers and tapes (1974); and the Federal Election Commission
regulations (1974).
98. Hearings II, supra note 46, at 209-10 (statement of Richard B. Smith, Chairman, Coordinating
Group on Regulatory Reform, American Bar Association). See also id. at 245 (statement of Rep.
John J. Moakley (D-Mass.), accompanied by John J. Dooling, Counsel, House Committee on
Rules).
99. Id. at 322 (remarks of Hon. Antonin Scalia, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit).
100. Id.
101. See Hearings I, supra note 36, at 115 (statement of Eugene Gressman); Hearings II, supra note 46,
at 320 (remarks of Rep. Levitas); Hearings III, supra note 55, at 659-60 (statement of Patricia P.
Bailey, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission); Hearings IV, supra note 68, at 10 (statement
of Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.)); Hearings V, supra note 70, at 6 (statement of Rep. John D.
Dingell (D-Mich.)), 311-12 (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks (D-Tex.)).
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hell. In one sense the Chadha decision has been of some service to Con-
gress because I think it is going to make Congress more aware of its legisla-
tive responsibilities.
In the final analysis we have the last word. During these hearings...
we were assured that the executive branch is not going to exploit their posi-
tion versus the Congress that may emerge from this decision. 0 2
This second view did not deny that the Court's decision was of great
importance, or that it called for appropriate action by Congress to fill the
gaps in the laws opened up by the judicial abolition of the legislative veto.
It did, however, reject the "train wreck" analogy' 013 and saw Chadha as
registering disparate effects at different points in the relationships among
Congress, the Executive, and the independent regulatory agencies. This
view carried with it the implication that the appropriate legislative response
was itself likely to be selective, dependent upon what was prudential, as well
as constitutional, in each situation. The conciliatory tone adopted by the
Administration joined with this belief in an individualized, measured re-
sponse, to dispel any sense of urgency about the situation in the minds of
many in Congress."° Those who shared this general attitude, however,
were by no means unanimous as to the best legislative strategy for carrying
forward these guidelines. Given the extreme decentralization of power in
Congress, it is not surprising that a comprehensive "package" of tailored
remedies for the fallen legislative veto has yet to emerge from Congress.
What has emerged is the subject of the next section of this article, but there
seems little doubt that the impact of the congressional hearings on the sub-
ject vitally influenced what was to occur in this regard.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION SINCE CHADHA
Over two years have elapsed since the Chadha decision. It is now possi-
ble to examine in retrospect not only the issues created by the case, but also
the means selected by Congress to adjust whatever imbalance of power has
resulted.
In the first place, it is instructive to note what has not happened, or at
least what Congress has failed to do up to now. Perhaps most apparent has
been the unwillingness of Congress to pursue any comprehensive approach
to the questions raised by Chadha. Congress has given no serious consider-
ation to proposed constitutional amendments to reverse the decision, or to
suggestions about removing court jurisdiction to hear such cases.'0 5 Early
recommendations that Congress repeal and then rewrite all existing laws
containing legislative vetoes have not been acted upon, nor have measures
calling for a thorough examination of all such laws, either by the relevant
102. Hearings I, supra note 36, at 156-57.
103. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66. See also Tate, High Court Decision Reopens Dispute
Over Impoundments" Congress Loses Spending Tool, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1331-34 (1983);
Hearings I, supra note 36, at 98 (statement of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State);
Hearings V, supra note 70, at 286 (statement of Professor Morris S. Ogul, University of
Pittsburgh).
105. See generally resolutions, supra note 86; Granat, supra note 87.
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committees 0 6 or a special commission charged with this responsibility.' °7
Wholesale resort to the appropriations power to prohibit spending for im-
plementing congressionally disfavored administrative actions has not been
pursued. Questions pertaining to the "ticking time bomb"'08 severability
issue have been left to the courts to decide, and acted upon by Congress
only when judicial pressure made it impossible to avoid them any longer.
Although Congress has examined the possibility of subjecting proposed
agency regulations to a joint resolution of approval or possible joint resolu-
tion of disapproval, either en masse or on a more individualized basis, Con-
gress still shows no signs of turning to either as a cure-all for the problems
of Chadha. Sentiment for a joint resolution of approval may well have
peaked in November, 1983 when the House of Representatives approved,
then narrowly rejected, a Levitas-sponsored floor amendment to the Haz-
ardous and Solid Waste Amendments bill'0 9 which sought to prevent the
Environmental Protection Agency from enforcing certain applications of
hazardous waste regulations until approved by Congress through joint reso-
lution. "' There was strong opposition to this type of approach, both on the
House floor as well as in previous hearings on the Chadha case."' This
opposition stemmed from the real concern that across-the-board resort to
such a device, even if constitutional, would ultimately swamp the legislative
process with the need to study each of the approximately 7000-8000 sepa-
rate rules issued each year by the agencies. 1 2 Moreover, Reagan adminis-
106. H.R. 4535, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) The bill died in the Judiciary Committee.
107. S. 1591, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) The bill died in the Governmental Affairs Committee. See
also H.R. Con. Res. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 131 CONG. REC. H137-45 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
1985).
108. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
109. H.R. 2867, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 CONG. REC. H9168-83 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983) (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 6901 (b)(5)-(8) (West Supp. 1985)).
110. See 129 CONG. REC. H9168-83 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983). In summarizing his amendment, Repre-
sentative Levitas said, "All I am asking, consistent with the Supreme Court's Chadha decision, is
that the Congress, you and I, have the opportunity to look at those regulations before we impose a
$100 million a year burden on the American public." Id. at 9170.
111. See id. at H9168-83. Strong opposition to the proposed amendment was voiced by several mem-
bers of the House. Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) stated:
It seems to me that passage of such a resolution by Congress would inevitably create a
presumption of validity in the court. It would become nearly impossible for a petitioner to
demonstrate in a court of law that a regulation was outside the scope of agency authority or
that it was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 9170. Representative James J. Florio (D-N.J.) also objected to the amendment, saying that:
"It is my opinion that [the proposed approval process] is clearly unconstitutional. The Court has
already said that it is unconstitutional. So what we are being asked to do is acquiesce in a process
that has clearly been ruled unconstitutional." Id. at 9173. Representative Howard L. Berman (D-
Calif.) also had harsh words for the proposal:
I do not believe that it is the role of this body to be a giant appeals court for dissatisfied
industries looking for a way to overturn Agency regulations they find objectionable. Any-
one wishing to challenge an agency rule on the grounds it does not conform to a law passed
by Congress can go to court. If we pass this amendment, we are either admitting we should
not have given EPA the responsibility in the first place or we do not trust judicial review.
Id. at 9174.
112. Hearings III, supra note 55, at 659-60. In voicing her concern over the increased workload, FTC
commissioner Patricia P. Bailey stated:
There are, by one estimate, some 76,500 full-time employees working in 57 federal regula-
tory agencies. Moreover, by your own best estimate of several years ago, the federal gov-
ernment issues some 7500 to 9000 rules each year, with the publication of proposed and
final regulations filling 74,120 pages of the Federal Register in 1980 alone. The Congress
has far too much important work to do than to attempt to duplicate the expertise developed
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tration officials and others argued that application of the joint resolution of
approval mechanism to executive actions in the realm of foreign affairs
would inject a considerable amount of uncertainty, inflexibility, and delay
into the foreign policy process.' 3 The alternative technique of subjecting
such rules to possible joint resolution of disapproval seems more practicable
because Congress would only need to act in situations where it disapproved
of the proposed rules. This mechanism, however, is potentially inadequate
for reviewing presidential and executive department actions, where the
greater likelihood of a presidential veto of such a joint resolution of disap-
proval would raise the question of whether there was a two-thirds majority
of both houses ready to override the President's veto. ' 4
As far as what legislative steps (beyond hearings and the introduction of
particular bills) Congress has taken in response to Chadha, a distinction
may be made between bills which merely made some headway in the con-
gressional process and those finally enacted. Among those enacted, several
merit special consideration.
The Legislative Veto Retained
Despite general acknowledgment in Congress that Chadha wiped out all
forms of the legislative veto, including the committee veto, the 98th Con-
gress saw the enactment of more than a few laws containing a sizable
number of provisions giving committees veto powers over certain executive
agency actions. Most of these laws were appropriations acts, and the veto
provisions therein typically required the funded agency to obtain the ap-
proval of both appropriations committees (or other relevant committees)
by these public servants in accomplishing their regulatory mission. Such an effort could, by
some measurements, triple your workload.
Id. at 660.
113. See, e.g., Hearings I, supra note 36, at 101. Referring to a proposal to present proposed arms sales
in a quarterly package, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam stated:
It just reduces the flexibility of the President to, for particular policy purposes, announce a
sale at a particular time, or announce his intention to notify. By restricting the President's
flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy, one may be limiting some very important oppor-
tunities for achievements, say at a time when one was attempting to settle a war or work out
a peace treaty.
Id. at 101.
114. Cf. discussion in Hearings I, supra note 36, at 142-45. In discussing the possibility of presidential
veto, Professor David Martin of the University of Virginia School of Law stated:
There is still the possibility that the President will veto disapproval legislation, thus requir-
ing a two-thirds vote by each House of Congress to override. Now that Chadha has sub-
jected all Congressional correctives to this requirement, Presidential vetoes definitely will
block some legislative disapprovals that otherwise might have taken effect. But in my view,
Presidential vetoes are far less likely than some have feared.
Id. at 144 See also Hearings II, supra note 46, at 216. Professor Harold Bruff of the University of
Texas School of Law also discussed the presidential veto stating:
If you decide to respond to Chadha by authorizing joint resolutions to disapprove agency
actions-that is one of the suggestions that has been brought forward-I think you need to
expect that when such a power applies to the executive branch agencies, it will be quite
difficult to make it effective. That is that because most regulations that are actually issued
by an executive branch agency, as opposed to an independent agency, probably have
enough support from the White House that the President would veto a bill overriding the
regulation. Not necessarily, of course. But what I am saying is that attempts to use a full
statutory override power as a major control on delegated power are made difficult by
Chadha.
Id. at 216.
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before reprogramming appropriated funds from one budgetary category to
another. The continued appearance of these clearly unconstitutional ve-
toes" 5 is not easy to explain. Related committee reports make no effort to
defend their legality, and there is little or no floor discussion of the vetoes.
What might have been shrugged off as mere carelessness in legislative
draftsmanship 1 6 cannot now be viewed as anything other than intentional
in light of the persistent (though occasional) use of these committee vetoes,
their number, 1 7 and the fact that repeated calls by the President1 I for their
elimination have gone unheeded. Behind this evident clash with the princi-
ples set forth in Chadha may be no more than reluctance of the congres-
sional appropriations committees to yield long-held committee prerogatives
in overseeing agency spending without a specific court decision on the
point. Despite the apparent need for such a judicial ruling, the jurisdic-
tional and standing barriers blocking a legal challenge to these vetoes are
formidable. Moreover, a recent federal court of appeals opinion119 indicates
that committee vetoes of agency actions may be retained in substance, if not
in appearance.
120
The Department of State Authorization Bill
Among the more troublesome effects of Chadha on the role of Congress
in foreign affairs is the likely unconstitutionality of section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution of 1973,121 which enables Congress, by concurrent reso-
lution, to order the President to withdraw American troops from hostilities
in the absence of a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization. 122
In one of several deliberate attempts to bring a past act into conformity
with Chadha, Senate Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) suc-
ceeded in adding from the floor an amendment to the 1984-1985 Depart-
ment of State Authorization bill 123 to substitute a joint resolution in place of
the concurrent resolution now specified by the War Powers Act. 124 A
House-Senate conference committee later deleted this change, but added a
provision stating that "any joint resolution" introduced to implement sec-
115. See Granat, Legislative Vetoes Are Passed Despite High Court Decision, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2235-36 (1983); Rothman, Despite High Court Ruling Legislative Vetoes Abound, 42 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1797-98 (1984).
116. Granat, supra note 115, at 2235-36.
117. Fisher found 30 veto provisions in 11 bills during the 12 months after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Chadha. The list has continued to grow since then. Rothman, supra note 115, at 1797.
118. President's Statement on Signing H.R. 5155 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1036
(1984); President's Statement on Signing H.R. 5713 Into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1039-40 (1984) (Executive would implement legislation containing legislative veto devices "in a
manner consistent with the Chadha decision.").
119. City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 1025.
121. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (1982)).
122. Id. at § 1544(b).
123. S. 1342, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See discussion of the Byrd Amendment at 129 CONG. REC.
S14,163-65 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (discussing Amendment No. 2350 to S. 1342); and 129 CONG.
REC. S14,255-56, S14,265, S14,267-70 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983) (discussing Amendment No. 2363
to Amendment No. 2350).
124. S. 1342, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S14,163 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983) (debate on
Amendment No. 2350 proposed by Senator Byrd).
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tion 5(b) would be subject to expediting rules of procedure designed to
bring such a resolution to reasonably quick floor consideration in both
houses. 25 Why the House conferees insisted upon this rather oblique way
of restoring political credibility to section 5(b), instead of the more straight-
forward Byrd amendment, was explained by House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee Chairman Zablocki in a delphic floor remark to the effect that the
Byrd language would be "unwise" at that point. 26 This may have meant
no more than that the House leadership did not wish to concede the uncon-
stitutionality of section 5(b) in its present form, or that modification of the
War Powers resolution to conform to Chadha was still under consideration.
Either way, the conference committee language recognized the imprudence
of leaving the law, a major attempt by Congress to reassert its authority
over warmaking, in its existing dubious form. Other sections of the bill
authorized the United States Information Agency and the Department of
State to reprogram appropriated funds only after fifteen days notice was
given to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee. 2 7 These are not vetoes, of course, but "report and
wait" provisions of the kind explicitly approved by the Supreme Court in
Chadha. 128 They afford Congress time to block disfavored reprogrammings
by constitutional means, such as through joint resolutions. 29
The Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984
The Reorganization Act Amendments of 198430 offer the first clear ex-
ample of post-Chadha resort to the Levitas-type joint resolution of approval
requirement for effectuating administrative actions. On numerous occa-
sions since 1932, Congress has enacted statutes authorizing the President,
within a limited period of time, to submit to Congress plans for reorganiz-
ing executive departments and agencies. Such plans became legally effective
unless within a designated period of time after receiving them (e.g., sixty
days) such plans were "vetoed" by Congress by vote of one or both
houses. '' Presidents have used this authority extensively, though not al-
125. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1013,
97 Stat. 1017 (1983), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 563, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) reprinted in 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1576, 1608.
126. 129 CONG. REC. H10332 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983).
127. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164 §§ 123, 214, 97
Stat. 1017 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2706, 1477 (1983)).
128. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935 n.9.
129. During the summer of 1985, Congress explicitly substituted report-and-wait requirements for two
legislative veto provisions contained in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975. Energy
Policy and Conservation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-58, § 102(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 102,
102-03 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6239(e), 6240(e) (1982)). See H.R. REP. No. 152, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 86, 87-88.
130. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901-912 (Supp. 11 1984)).
131. Examples of prior reorganization laws containing legislative vetoes include: the Economy Act of
1932, Pub. L. No. 72-212, §§ 401-408, 47 Stat. 382, 413-15 (1983); the Reorganization Act of 1939,
Pub. L. No 76-19, § 5, 53 Stat. 561, 562-63 (1940); the Reorganization Act of 1949, Pub. L. No.
81-109, § 6, 63 Stat. 203, 205 (1950). See generally Fisher & Moe, Delegating with Ambivalence:
The Legislative Veto and Reorganization Authority, in STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 164-
247 (Congressional Research Service Committee Print 1980).
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ways with success.1 32 The most recent pre-Chadha example of this, the Re-
organization Act of 1977131 contained a sixty-day waiting period, and
allowed a vote of disapproval by either the House or the Senate (one-house
veto) to kill a reorganization plan. 134 By its own terms, presidential author-
ity under this statute expired April 7, 1981.135 Experience under this and
earlier statutes made a temporary renewal of such authority desirable, how-
ever, and a bill to this effect was introduced early in the 98th Congress.' 36
Action on this bill began a year later (nine months after Chadha), and the
bill, as amended, was finally signed into law by President Reagan on No-
vember 8, 1984.137
The Act, which expired on the last day of 1984, substituted for the one-
house veto in the 1977 Act a requirement that presidentially-submitted re-
organization plans be approved by both houses (joint resolution of approval)
within ninety calendar days of continuous session of Congress after receiv-
ing them from the President.1 3 ' This more recent statute retained earlier
provisions expediting consideration of such joint resolutions in both houses,
but specifically stated that failure of either house to act upon such a resolu-
tion within the ninety-day period was legally tantamount to disapproval of
the resolution by that house. 139 Other sections of the 1984 statute imposed
specific informational requirements'" and substantive limitations upon pro-
posed reorganization plans. 41 Although there was little debate on the bill
on the floor of the House or Senate, it was fully supported by the White
House142 and by Representative Levitas, who dubbed it "son of legislative
veto" and stated that it "should be a blueprint for [Congress] to follow in
frequent future occasions."' 4 3 Calling attention to the relatively "broad"
reorganization authority given the President, as compared to the rulemak-
ing authority delegated to administrative agencies (which contained more
congressional "guidelines"), Senator Levin explained why he thought sub-
jecting reorganization proposals to the far more difficult affirmative ap-
proval process made "good sense:"
[W]e can't really tell in advance what is appropriate at this time for reor-
ganization activity. It must be done on an individual case by case basis, and
we are asking the President to recommend to us, when and what type of
reorganization efforts should be taken. There are unforeseeable, unique cir-
cumstances which are impossible to identify beforehand. So, in this type of
situation-which is, again quite different from agency rulemaking-the
132. See J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 210-13 (1964); S. BAILEY, CON-
GRESS IN THE SEVENTIES 92-93 (2d ed. 1970).
133. Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 91 Stat. 29 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901-912 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 906(a).
135. Id. § 905(b).
136. H.R. 1314, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
137. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3129 (amending 5 U.S.C.
§§ 901-912 (1977)).
138. 5 U.S.C.A. § 906(a) (West Supp. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 903 (1977 & West Supp. 1985).
141. Id. § 905 (1977 & West Supp. 1985).
142. 130 CONG. REC. H2520 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep. Frank Horton (R-N.Y.)).
143. 130 CONG. REC. H2521 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984).
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joint resolution of approval is appropriate. 4 4
As for other existing statutory vetoes which needed revising in light of
Chadha, as well as new legislation where some kind of veto should be in-
serted, Levin insisted each should be examined in its own context with
"careful thought to the [c]ongressional purpose and the surrounding
circumstances." 145
Legislative Ratification of Reorganization Plans
Another action taken by the 98th Congress that should be noted in this
regard is the passage in October, 1984 of the extraordinary measure known
as H.R.6225 and solemnly entitled "An Act to prevent disruption of the
structure and functioning of the Government by ratifying all reorganization
plans as a matter of law."'' 46 The genesis of this bill is to be found in the
more than 100 lawsuits brought in the federal courts after Chadha, in which
the authority of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to enforce provisions of two major civil rights laws was seriously
questioned. 147 Acting by virtue of the authority granted him by the Reor-
ganization Act of 1977, President Jimmy Carter, in 1978, submitted to Con-
gress a plan' 48 to transfer from the Department of Labor to the EEOC
authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act 149 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 5° Although the Reorganization Act subjected
such plans to a one-house veto,15 neither the Senate nor the House disap-
proved Carter's plan and the transfer of jurisdiction took place as
scheduled.
In the months after the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha, however,
EEOC suits to enforce the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA were resisted by
defendants who argued that the EEOC had no authority to enforce these
laws, inasmuch as the presidential transfer of authority was accomplished
by virtue of a law-the Reorganization Act of 1977-that was itself uncon-
stitutional.' 52 This argument depended upon a finding that the legislative
veto in that act-now likely unconstitutional if Chadha were to be applied
retroactively' 53-was not severable from the remainder of the act, thus ren-
144. 130 CONG. REC. S14536 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984).
145. Id.
146. Pub. L. No. 98-532, 98 Stat. 2705 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1984)).
147. A representative sample of these lawsuits is: Delta Data Systems Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. CBS, Inc.,
743 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1984); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1984); City
of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kennedy for President Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm., 734 F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Moore v. United States House of Repre-
sentatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Wall v. INS, 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984); Tooloee v.
INS, 722 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1983); Ghaelian v. INS, 717 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1984); LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1983); B.K.
Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713 (2nd Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am., Inc. v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
148. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. app. I (Supp. 1986).
149. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982)).
150. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 621 (1978)).
151. See supra note 134.
152. See supra note 147.
153. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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dering the entire law and all plans carried out under its aegis unconstitu-
tional. The EEOC generally attempted to rebut such arguments by
asserting the severability of the veto provision of the 1977 Reorganization
Act and/or by arguing that various congressional actions since 1978 had
explicitly or implicitly bestowed legislative "ratification" upon President
Carter's transfer of law enforcement responsibilities to the EEOC.
For present purposes it is enough to say that the lower federal courts
were badly divided in their findings on these claims. 54 In order to "dispel
the cloud of uncertainty""' surrounding both President Carter's action and
all previous reorganization plans assumed to have gone into effect since not
vetoed by Congress, Congress was forced to take the corrective action con-
tained in H.R.6225. 5 6 This bill simply states:
Section 1. The Congress hereby ratifies and affirms as law each reorgani-
zation plan that has, prior to the date of enactment of this Act, been imple-
mented pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 9 of title 5, United States
Code [the 1977 Reorganization Act], or any predecessor Federal reorgani-
zation statute.
Section 2. Any actions taken prior to the date of enactment of this Act
pursuant to a reorganization plan that is ratified and affirmed by section 1
shall be considered to have been taken pursuant to a reorganization ex-
pressly approved by Act of Congress.
The House Committee on Government Operations sought to make clear in
its report accompanying the bill that this remedy for the alleged jurisdic-
tional defects of the EEOC's authority should not be understood to infer
any congressional views concerning the legal questions arising out of
Chadha: "In enacting H.R.6225, the Committee does not intend to take a
position on any argument advanced in judicial action involving the effect of
the legislative veto on reorganization authority."' 57
The District of Columbia Home Rule Law
Pressure of another kind forced Congress to attend to the legal and fi-
nancial uncertainties created by Chadha for local government in the na-
tion's capital. Under the 1973 District of Columbia home rule law, any act
of the District of Columbia Council was subject to review by Congress;
depending upon the subject of the act, Congress could disapprove it by a
vote of one or both houses, without presentment to the President.' The
shadow of unconstitutionality cast over these legislative veto provisions by
the Chadha decision raised concern not only for the validity of laws passed
by the D.C. Council generally, but in particular for the cash-strapped Dis-
154. The principal rulings were: EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984) (EEOC
enforcement authority upheld); Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (EEOC
enforcement authority upheld); EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1984) (EEOC enforce-
ment authority found lacking).
155. H.R. REP. No. 1104, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4423, 4426.
156. Pub. L. No. 98-532, 98 Stat. 2705 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1984)).
157. H.R. REP. No. 1104, supra note 155.
158. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
198, § 303, 602(c)(l)-(2), 87 Stat. 774, 784, 814 (1973).
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trict government's past and future bond issues, whose marketability obvi-
ously depended upon their legality. Once again, the questions of
retroactivity and severability left in the wake of Chadha became of critical
and practical importance.15 9
On October 4, 1983, the House of Representatives passed H.R.3932 to
bring the D.C. home rule law into line with Chadha by replacing the uncon-
stitutional congressional review mechanisms with provisions allowing Con-
gress a thirty-day period to block D.C. Council-enacted laws by joint
resolution of disapproval, which would then have to be sent to the Presi-
dent."6 Although reported out of committee with amendments by the Re-
publican-controlled Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September
13, 1984,161 H.R.3932 was opposed by the Reagan administration, which
would have preferred that D.C. Council changes in the District of Colum-
bia Criminal Code be affirmatively approved by joint resolution of Con-
gress. The administration yielded on this demand in exchange for
extending the time for Congress' review of changes in the D.C. criminal law
from thirty to sixty days, and the essence of H.R.3932 ultimately was incor-
porated into a broader appropriations bill which Congress passed on Octo-
ber 11, 1984.162 In addition to retaining the joint resolution of disapproval
mechanism, this measure seeks to forestall uncertainty about the legal sta-
tus of past D.C. Council actions by specifically validating all actions which
had not been disapproved by Congress under the terms of the original home
rule law. Moreover, the measure confirms the null and void status of Coun-
cil-enacted laws which had been disapproved through pre-Chadha congres-
sional veto resolutions. Neither house of Congress produced much floor
debate on these changes to the D.C. home rule law.
Other Congressional Action
At other points during the 98th Congress, the legislative veto gave way
to more restrictive legislation. What began as an effort by Congress to re-
serve the power to suspend military aid to El Salvador through a concur-
rent resolution of both houses (two-house veto), 163 finally emerged as a
Supplemental Appropriations Act provision which dropped all forms of the
veto and substituted a reporting requirement. This provision required the
President to report to Congress every sixty days on the progress made in El
Salvador toward achieving democratic government, the rule of law, and the
protection of human rights as a condition of military aid to the Central
American nation."6 Similarly, a statutory provision 165 limited the amount
159. See 129 CONG. REC. H7903-07 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983) (statement of Rep. Walter E. Fauntroy (D-
D.C.)); Rothman, District's South Africa Law Ignites Battle, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 322
(1984); Tate, Congress Loads Up Emergency Funding Bill, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2355, 2358
(1984).
160. H.R. 3932, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H7903-07 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983).
161. S. REP. No. 635, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
162. H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H12,283-84, H12,289 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1984 and Nov. 14, 1984) becoming Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 131, 98 Stat. 1837, 1974-76 (1984).
163. H.R. 2992, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2934, H3029 (daily ed. May 12, 1983 and May
17, 1983).
164. Military Assistance-Funds Appropriated to the President, Pub. L. No. 98-332, 98 Stat. 283, 284-
285 (1984).
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of American aid to anti-governmental Contras in Nicaragua to $24 million
for fiscal year 1984, replacing earlier efforts to give the intelligence commit-
tees of both houses a veto over covert activities of American intelligence
agencies in Nicaragua. 66 This was followed during the second session of
the 98th Congress by a provision of the Fiscal 1985 Department of Defense
Appropriations Act167 prohibiting all United States intelligence-gathering
agencies from expending any appropriated funds to aid anti-government
military operations in Nicaragua.1 68 Congress could remove this prohibi-
tion only through joint resolution, followed by presentment to the
President. 1 69
The relatively few laws enacted do not, of course, exhaust the considera-
tion given by the 98th Congress to possible alternatives to the legislative
veto. These and other devices can be found in a number of bills which were
sidetracked in the legislative process and eventually died. Also passed over
were the many unrecorded instances in the day-to-day negotiations between
congressional committees and administrative agencies where the oversight
powers of the former kept the presence of the legislative veto alive in spirit,
if not quite in law.' 71 Finally, the cure-alls which seemed so pressing in
June of 1983 were quietly interred in committee.
CONCLUSION
Events and non-events since Chadha recall to mind the proverbial tem-
pest in a teapot. Notwithstanding the Court's direct attack upon legislative
power in the case, the early tide of criticism by members of Congress
quickly receded in the face of considerable uncertainty about how much
real damage the decision had actually inflicted upon the position of Con-
gress in the federal constitutional and political system.' 7' That Chadha
seems to have produced little in the way of congressional backlash may be
attributed to several factors, including support for the Court's decision
within elements of Congress itself and the failure of the Chadha ruling to
stir up any real degree of controversy in general public opinion. Although
constitutional issues involving the doctrine of separation of powers on occa-
sion whet the interest of the public,172 the legislative veto issue never be-
came such an occasion.
Another key to understanding the response of Congress in the wake of
165. Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983).
166. S.1230, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
167. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. VIII, sec. 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1937 (1984).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (In absence of statutory
requirement, decision of GSA Administrator to treat committee disapproval of proposed sale of
surplus federal property as binding, is properly within administrator's discretion, and not adher-
ence to an unconstitutional legislative veto).
171. In sharp contrast to this was the reaction of Congress to such judicially-imposed limits on legisla-
tive power as set down in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936); and, of more recent vintage, Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See generally
C. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT (1961) and W. MURPHY, CONGRESS
AND THE COURT (1962) for an analysis of the Court-curbing bills introduced in Congress in the
aftermath of Watkins and related Warren Court decisions during the 1950's.
172. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951).
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Chadha was the refusal by the leadership of both houses to view the deci-
sion in fundamentally apocalyptic terms, and instead to call for a deliberate
effort to sort out what the loss of the veto meant in terms of both law and
politics. The leadership discouraged an immediate resort to some other
surefire way of making the Executive and the bureaucracy more accounta-
ble to Congress- The lack of a sense of urgency during the subsequent con-
gressional hearings was underscored by an increasing sense of awareness
that Congress may not have lost very much in the Chadha ruling that could
not be regained by ordinary legislative means. This development was nur-
tured by a succession of Administration and agency witnesses whose testi-
mony helped to convince many previously apprehensive members that there
was no crisis in the offing. By the close of the first session of the 98th Con-
gress it was already clear that the issues raised in Chadha had been rele-
gated to the congressional back burner. Legislation relating to these issues
since then has been pragmatic and ad hoc, evincing a willingness to let the
lower federal judiciary pick its way through the minefield of claims of retro-
activity and severability. The United States Supreme Court, sitting in silent
anticipation of eventually facing these claims, has not accepted a case in-
volving the legislative veto issue since the summary rulings of July 6,
1983.173
What is the likelihood that this state of affairs will continue? The 99th
Congress, now well into its second session, shows no alacrity for reviving
full-scale hearings on the legislative veto, and the handful of bills and reso-
lutions designed to resurrect or provide a comprehensive substitute for what
was lost in Chadha, have been consigned for the most part to unfriendly
committees.1 74 The legislative veto lost one of its main spokesmen with the
surprise defeat of Representative Elliott Levitas in the 1984 congressional
elections. Given the persistent inertia and decentralization of power within
the lawmaking process, the apparent defeat suffered by Congress in Chadha
may lead to no more than an intensification of the veto alternatives cur-
rently being experimented with by the legislators. Continued divided party
control within the political branches of the federal government, made a fea-
ture of the American governmental process by the 1980 elections, could
facilitate such experimentation.
173. Indeed, the Court has rejected five opportunities to discuss these claims with respect to specific
federal laws. See EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 S. Ct. 3499 (1984), dismissing appeal from 570 F.
Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983); EEOC v. Martin Industries, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 63 (1984), dismissing
appeal from 581 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ala. 1984); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 105 S. Ct. 63
(1984), dismissing appeal from Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,365 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Dyke v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 105 S. Ct. 173 (1984), denying cert. to 734 F.2d 797 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1984);
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 105 S. Ct. 576 (1985), denying cert. to 690 F.2d
1375 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982) and three other connected cases.
174. H.R.J. Res. 32, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Referred to the Judiciary Committee); H.R. Res. 82,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Referred to the Judiciary Committee); H.R. Con. Res. 2, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985) (Referred to the Rules Committee); H.R. Res. 340, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(Referred to the Judiciary and Rules Committees); H.R. Res. 1339, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(Referred to the Judiciary and Rules Committees); S. Res. 1145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (Re-
ferred to the Judiciary Committee); S. Res. 1377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Referred to the Govern-
mental Affairs Committee). The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure approved S. 1145 without amendment on November 9, 1985 but, with this
sole exception, no other action was taken on any of these measures during the first session of the
99th Congress. See supra related notes 37, 86, 89-90, 107.
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Congressional Response to Chadha
There seems little doubt that the lingering presence of the committee
veto is a patent evasion of the principles of Chadha. It would appear to
only be a matter of time before the courts deliver the coup de grdce to the
committee veto for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has shown no
signs of executing a sudden about-face in the matter. Second, the federal
judiciary has shown a willingness, often with the complicity of the legisla-
tive branch, to find justiciability in a growing number of cases involving
Congress' structure, prerogatives, and processes.
It is difficult to estimate the future trends of Congress in further re-
sponse to Chadha. The principal uncertainties relate to the policies fol-
lowed by the federal judiciary and executive insofar as they could be viewed
as serious threats to the preservation of Congress' traditional roles of bu-
reaucratic oversight and consultant in the realm of foreign policy. Case-by-
case judicial determinations of the retroactivity and severability issues noted
earlier will likely occasion the same sort of ad hoc legislative responses
found in the 98th Congress. But significant new judicial separation-of-pow-
ers strictures imposed upon Congress could generate irresistible pressures
upon the legislative branch to strike back at the judiciary with power-curb-
ing measures of its own. Similarly, it is not difficult to predict that actions
by the President or cabinet officers, 7 ' which appear to signify the end of the
post-Chadha spirit of mutual restraint on the part of Congress and Execu-
tive, will provoke another search for a better way to skin the administrative
cat. Until then, the recent patterns of cautious experimentation by Con-
gress with a variety of less-than-perfect mechanisms are likely to persist."7 6
175. See National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983). Former Interior
Department Secretary James Watt refused to accede to a 1983 request of the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee that he temporarily withhold from lease certain tracts of coal-bearing
public land in North Dakota and Montana on which his department proposed to open bids.
176. Recent evidence of a continuation of these patterns can be seen in the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Amendments Act of 1985 cited supra note 129, and the Export Administration Amendments
Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985). The latter statute reviews the Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1979)) by
requiring advance joint congressional resolution of approval before the President may implement
certain foreign policy powers delegated by Congress. Following the same approach employed in
the 1984 Reorganization Act, Congress must now affirmatively approve presidential proposals (1)
to expand or impose new export controls which lack compliance with certain congressionally-
mandated procedures (sec. 108(o)), (2) to impose selective export controls on agricultural com-
modities (sec. 110(d)), and (3) to join with other nations in cooperative nuclear agreements which
the President or Congress believe should be exempted from present statutory criteria for such
agreements (sec. 301). The texts of the above laws are reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 120, 136-37, 140-41, 159-62.
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